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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE TORT LIABILITY OF THE STATE OF INDIANA: PERKINS V. STATE

In Perkins v. State" the Indiana Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity2 did not bar plaintiffs' damage action
against the state for illness allegedly caused by a contaminated lake in a
state park. Although the court held that the state is not immune for nongovernmental functions,' it refused to eliminate the doctrine entirely.4
1. -Ind.-, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969) [Hereinafter cited as Perkins.]
2. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, simply stated, is that a government cannot
be sued without its consent. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 996 (3d ed.
1964) states:
While these [immunities of governments] may or may not have had their roots
in Roman law, the origin of the idea underlying them in the common law seems
to have been the theory, allied with the divine right of Kings, that "the king
can do no wrong," together with the feeling that it was necessarily a contradiction of his sovereignty to allow him to be sued as of right in his own
courts.
3. For cases upholding the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Bracht v. Conservation Comm'n., 118
Ind. App. 77, 76 N.E.2d 848 (1947) ; Busby v. Indiana Bd. of Agr., 85 Ind. App. 572,
154 N.E. 883 (1927) ; City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Water Co., 185 Ind. 227, 113
N.E. 369 (1916) ; State v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 175 Ind. 59, 93 N.E. 213 (1910) ; May
v. State, 133 Ind. 567, 33 N.E. 352 (1893) ; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Iddings,
28 Ind. App. 504, 62 N.E. 112 (1901); State v. Young, 238 Ind. 452, 151 N.E.2d 697
(1958) ; State v. Patten, 209 Ind. 482, 199 N.E. 577 (1936) ; Hogston v. Bell, 185 Ind.
536, 112 N.E. 883 (1916) ; State v. Portsmouth Say. Bank, 106 Ind. 435, 7 N.E. 379
(1886) ; State ex rel. Woodward v. Smith, 85 Ind. App. 56, 152 N.E. 836 (1926) ; State
ex rel. Fry v. Superior Court, 205 Ind. 355, 186 N.E. 310 (1933) ; State ex rel. Hord
v. Board of Comm'rs., 101 Ind. 69 (1884). The appellate court decision in Perkins,
reversed by the supreme court, approved the following language from the case of
Bracht v. Conservation Comm'n., 118 Ind. App. 77, 83, 76 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1947):
Appellant has presented a very forceful argument and one in which there may
be merit; however, the reasons urged by the appellant are proper ones to be
presented to the legislature in behalf of legislation allowing tort actions
to be brought against state agencies and departments, but they cannot
be considered by the courts in view of the law as written in Section 24,
Article 4 of the Indiana Constitution....
-Ind. App.-, 244 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1969) (emphasis in original).

4. Experience demonstrates that distinguishing governmental from proprietary
functions does not establish sufficient guidelines. Complaining about the "legalistic"
distinctions produced by the governmental-proprietary rule, Fuller & Casner, Municipal
Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARv. L. REv. 437, 442 (1941).

[hereinafter referred

to as Tort Liability], summarized:
After an enormous amount of litigation on what is a proprietary function or
a governmental function, these may now be classified within broad limits:
activities of fire prevention, police, education, and general government are
governmental; municipal railways, airports, gas, water, and light systems are
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Before the Perkins decision, article IV, § 24 of the Constitution
of Indiana was interpreted as preventing nonconsenual suits against the
state.' To date the legislature has passed only two acts significantly
affecting state sovereign immunity;6 one involves contract claims,7 'and
proprietary; activities involving streets, sidewalks, playgrounds, bridges, viaducts, and sewers are governmental in some jurisdictions and proprietary in

others. Criteria for determination of these classes of functions are neither cer-

tain nor carefully followed by the courts.
If the act benefits the public in general, it is a governmental function; if it serves the
private interests of the municipal corporation, it is a proprietary function. This distinction has allowed courts to evade the harsh effects of total immunity, but borderline cases
have made the distinction a troublesome tool to use. To assist in this definitional
dilemma, courts often apply the test that pecuniary profit to the government renders
the function proprietary. The theory is that when the government makes a profit from
its activity, it is competing with free enterprise and performing a function which could
be accomplished by private persons or corporations, and that in these situations, the
government should be held responsible to the same extent that a priyate corporation
would be. In contrast to this, the judicial rationale for immunity in the performance of
governmental functions is that when a city or town is acting in such capacity, it is
but an arm of the sovereign state and is therefore not liable. For the view that the city
shares in the sovereignty of the state only when performing governmental functions, see
Note, Governmental Tort Liability in Indiana, 23 IND. L.J. 468, 476 (1948). See also,
Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 131 (1924) [hereinafter
cited as Governmental Liability] and infra note 37.
5. IND. CONST. art IV, § 24, states:
Suits against the state.-Provision may be made, by general law, for bringing
suit against the State, as to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this
Constitution; but no special act authorizing such suit to be brought, or making
compensation to any person claiming damages against the State, shall ever be
passed.
6. Of less importance are three acts passed in 1933 which allow suits against the
state in limited situations. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-229 (Burns Repl. 1946) allows an
individual to make the state of Indiana a party defendant to an action to foreclose a
mortgage or to quiet title to real estate. IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2614(a) (Burns
Repl. 1961) allows actions against the state to recover improperly paid taxes
(interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treas., 323 U.S. 459 (1945), as not allowing a suit in federal court). IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 27-120 (Burns Repl. 1960), the Indiana "Drainage Statute," was first interpreted
as giving the state's consent to be sued [see State v. Roberts, 226 Ind. 106, 76 N.E.2d
832 (1948) and Myers v. Sell, 226 Ind. 608, 81 N.E.2d 846 (1948)], but later the court
held consent was required in addition to the "Drainage Statute" [see State v. Pulaski
Circuit Court, 231 Ind. 245, 108 N.E.2d 185 (1952)]. In 1945, the legislature passed a
municipal liability act, IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2030a (Burns Repl. 1965), waiving
immunity where the city negligently operates a police or fire department vehicle.
Finally, IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1711 (Burns RepI. 1968) allows a person having interest
in any land taken for "public use" to bring suit for the value of such land.
7. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-3401 (Burns Repl. 1968). However, this Act was held
inapplicable to tort actions. Michigan Cent. RR. v. State, 85 Ind. App. 557, 155 N.E. 50
(1927) ; State v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 175 Ind. 59, 93 N.E. 213 (1910). In 1959, the
Indiana legislature passed S. B. 63, which provided for the prosecution of tort claims
against the state without restriction as to the type of function involved. The Governor,
however, vetoed this piece of legislation. S.B. 63, Ind. Gen. Ass'y. 91st Reg. Sess., vol.
I (1959), reads:
Any person, firm or corporation may prosecute a claim in tort arising after
the effective date of this act, against any unit of government of the State of
Indiana. Such claim shall be prosecuted in the circuit or superior court either
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the other enabled state or municipal corporations to purchase liability
insurance.'
Although the courts initially had difficulty reconciling the purchase
of insurance with a disclaimer of liability, they retained governmental
immunity by holding that insurance did not constitute a waiver of it.9
In 1960, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the earlier insurance cases
in Flowers v. Board of Commissioners.0 In finding the county liable
for the negligent operation of a skating rink, the court held that sovereign
immunity is not a defense where insurance has been purchased." After
Flowers, both cities and counties were held liable for their proprietary
functions, and any unit of government which purchased insurance for
governmetal functions "might" be held as having waived its immunity.'
In Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis" and Klepinger v. Board of
Commissioners,4 the Indiana Appellate Court abrogated immunity for
cities and counties, thereby solving the problem of distinguishing between
proprietary and governmental functions and making unnecessary the
somewhat strained interpretation of the 1941 Insurance Act announced
in Flowers. The Brinkman case involved an allegation of wrongful death
of the county of the residence of the claimant or of the county where the
claim arose.
The language of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964), the New
York Court of Claims Act, N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963) ; and Hawaii's State
Tort Liability Act, HAWAI REV. LAWS § 662-2 (1968), is very similar to that of S.B. 63.
Two states, Utah [UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to -34 (1965)] and California [CAL.
Gov'T. CODE § 835 (West 1966)] enacted tort claims acts which list the specific instances
when the state shall be liable.
8. IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-1819 (Burns Repl. 1952).
9. In Hummer v. School City, 124 Ind. App. 30, 112 N.E.2d 891 (1953), the plaintiff contended that the school city waived its immunity by purchasing liability insurance
under the 1941 Insurance Act. The court rejected this argument, holding that the Act
did not provide for insuring the governmental unit, but only its officers and employees.
See Note, The Decline of Sovereign Immunity in Indiana, 36 IND. L.J. 223 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Decline].
10. 240 Ind. 668, 168 N.E.2d 224 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Flowers].
11. Id. at 227. A review of the Flowers decision concluded that it appeared clear
that the state would be liable, to the extent of any insurance coverage, for non-governmental torts and that the language of Flowers indicated that the state might be liable
for governmental functions if insurance had been procured pursuant to the statute.
See Decline, supra note 9, at 235.
12. See Decline, supra note 9, at 235-36:
If the state is not to be held in any case where liability insurance is not procured,
the law is placing an unjust premium on the absence of insurance. A unit of
government could escape all liability and save the insurance costs by merely
not purchasing insurance. . . . One additional problem . . . [is that] . . . [t]he
state or municipality could purchase ridiculously low policies and insulate
themselves against liability for a greater amount under the provision.
13. 141 Ind. App. 662, 231 N.E.2d 1967), transfer denied Aug. 7, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Brinknan].
14. 143 Ind. App. 155, 239 N.E.2d 160 (1968), transfer denied Nov. 4, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Klepinger].
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negligently caused by an Indianapolis police officer while on duty.
Adopting the proprietary-governmental distinction, the plaintiff contended that the officer was engaged in a proprietary function at the time of
the deceased's arrest, and, therefore, the city should not be shielded by
immunity. Faced with Indiana precedent which labeled police activities
as governmental,' 5 the appellate court eliminated the distinction, thus
ending all municipal immunity."
In Klepinger, the plaintiff's injury was allegedly caused by the
negligent maintenance of a county bridge, which, under Indiana precedent,'" was a proprietary function. The appellate court could have held
the county liable because of the proprietary nature of the function. However, the court went further by stating that since Brinkman the governmental-proprietary distinction, as it applied to counties, should be
ignored. 8
Consequently, the Perkins court was confronted with a trend toward
the total elimination of governmental immuriity in Indiana. Nevertheless,
the Perkins court limited its holding to proprietary functions. 9
15. Morris v. Switzerland County, 131 Ind. 285, 31 N.E. 77 (1892) ; Smith v. City
of Gary, 93 Ind. App. 675, 178 N.E. 572 (1931) ; City of Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88
Ind. 330 (1882); Vaughtman v. Town of Waterloo, 14 Ind. App. 649, 43 N.E. 476

(1895).
16. The court said, 141 Ind. App. at 665, 231 N.E.2d at 171-72:
The governmental-proprietary rule, however, often produces legalistic distinctions that are only remotely related to the fundamental considerations of
municipal tort responsibility... [A] fter careful consideration we are of the
opinion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no proper place in the
administration of a municipal corporation.
17. City of Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind. 18, 112 N.E. 994 (1916); Aiken v. City of
Columbus, 167 Ind. 139, 78 N.E. 657 (1906).
18. The court said in Klepinger:
We are of the opinion that that the decision and reasoning of the Brinkmanz
case should be applied to the counties of Indiana and, therefore, hold that the
doctrine of governmental immunity as it applies to the counties of Indiana is
hereby abrogated and that counties may now be held liable for the torts of its
[sic] officers, agents or employees. . . . It is further our opinion that in
determining the tort liability of a county or a city, our courts can now ignore
the governmental-proprietary distinction and render judgments and assess
damages without regard to the policy limits of any insurance carried by the
city or county.
143 Ind. App. at 201, 239 N.E2d at 173.
19. After noting that tort immunity for charities and for hospitals has been
"whittled down by an enlightened judiciary," -Ind. at -, 251 N.E.2d at 33, the Perkins
court approvingly refers to several legal scholars who have criticized the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Among the articles cited by the court is the work of Professor
Edwin Borchard, the leading critic of sovereign immunity. See Governmental Liability,
supra note 4.
Professor Borchard sharply criticizes the distinction between proprietary and

governmental functions:
In few, if any, branches of the law have the courts labored more abjectly under
the supposed inexorable domination of formulas, phrases, and terminology, with
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The court considered Brinkman and Klepinger as having held
municipalities liable at least for their proprietary functions.2" This
reading appears perplexingly restrictive unless the court reached the
unlikely conclusion that the police officer's conduct in Brinkman was a
proprietary function. Another remote possibility for the restrictive reading
may be a result of the fact that the Brinkman court did not expressly
determine that the officer's conduct was governmental. 2 Yet, both possibilities conflict with the express language in Brinkman and Klepinger
to the effect that city and county activities, either proprietary or governmental, were subject to tort liability.22
The statement in Perkins that all governmental units must be treated
alike adds to the confusion of the holding." If the court is going to treat
all units of government alike, it must either abrogate immunity for all
the result that facts have often been tortured into the framework of a formula,
lacking in many cases any sound basis of reason or policy. This is notably the
case in the effort to apply the supposedly settled rule that the municipal corporation is not liable for torts committed by its agents in the performance of
governmental, political or public functions, whereas it is liable when the tort
is committed in the performance of corporate, private or ministerial functions.
Id. at 129.
While it is true that he discusses the distinction as it relates to municipalities and
not the state government, Borchard makes it clear that all levels of government should
be treated the same:
. . . with the deflation of the conception of sovereignty and the realization that
all political group organizations, from the smallest to the largest, are merely
means adopted by the people to enable them to perform certain public services,
that there is no sound reason either for differentiating their responsibility
according to size or form or organization or to grant them immunity for the
torts of their agents and employees.
Id. at 45.
20. The court stated:
The courts of this state have long held that a municipality, an instrument of
the state government, is liable at least for its proprietary acts where someone
has been tortiously injured. . . . These governmental agencies [counties and
municipalities] are in reality a part of the state government. They are supported by taxes and they have been made liable for their tortious acts in the
area of proprietary businesses operated by those governmental agencies.
-Ind. at -, 251 N.E.2d at 34.
At first impression this statement appears to emphasize cases decided prior to
Brinkman and Klepinger, namely: City of Indianapolis v. Butzke, 217 Ind. 203, 26
N.E.2d 754 (1940), rehearing denied, 217 Ind. 214, 27 N.E.2d 350 (1940) ; City of
Evansville v. Blue, 212 Ind. 130, 8 N.E.2d 224 (1937) ; City of Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind.
18, 112 N.E. 994 (1916).
21. See note 15 supra & text accompanying.
22. See notes 16 & 18 supra.
23. The court said, -Ind. at-, 251 N.E.2d at 34-35:
If the cities, towns and lesser agencies of the state are liable under a principle
of law, consistently then the state, as we have previously said, should be liable
for its acts under like circumstances. . . . It is of little concern to the injured
party whether the injury was caused by a city, county or state. We feel, to be
consistent, hte common law principle should be applicable to all governmental
units alike.
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state functions or revive the proprietary-governmental distinction for
cities and counties. If in fact the latter was what the court sought to do,
then the subtle rejection of the language found in Brinkman and Klepinger appears to be an unnecessary method of accomplishing the task. 4
If the Perkins court intended for Brinkman and Klepinger to remain
unaltered, the result is inconsistent with its earlier statement, since all
units of government are not being treated equally.
'Many of the policies concerning immunity for governmental functions were not adequately dealt with in the Perkins opinion. The most
persistent argument supporting sovereign immunity is that to allow all
tort claims may deplete the treasury to a point where the proper performance of governmental duties will be impaired. 5 Such a financial
fear may be partially justified, especially if the courts were to adopt a
wholesale abrogation of immunity. Although liability insurance is available to spread the cost of state tort liability,2" coverage may not always
be available for all state functions, such as highway design, construction,
maintenance and repair where the exposure to risks is extensive and
difficult to predict. Even if the risk could be estimated, the premium
24. The court in Perkins, said: "There may be some logical reason why a governeient should not be liable for its governmental actions and functions." -Ind. at-, 251
N.E.2d at 35 [emphasis added] . By saying "a government" instead of "a state government," the Perkins court left open the possibility that it had reservations about the total
abrogation of immunity made by the appellate court for cities and counties in Brinkman and in Klepinger. In Gross Income Tax Div. v. City of Goshen, -Ind.-,
252
N.E.2d 259, 264 (1970), the appellate court cites the Perkins result as aiding in the
court's determination that the sale by the City of Goshen of an electric generating and
distribution system constitutes a proprietary function, thereby making the income from
the sale taxable. However, the appellate court did not solve the issue of whether
or not Perkins revived the proprietary-governmental distinction for lower levels of
government.
25. See Blachly & Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A
Comparative Survey, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 181, 195 (1942). LAW & CONTEMePORARY
PROBLemS devoted its entire Spring issue in 1942 (vol. IX, No. 2) to the question of
sovereign immunity. See also Tort Liability, supra note 4, at 461. This financial fear
has been offered as explaining why the United States, after winning its independence,
incorporated into its legal structure the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which was
so closely identified with England.
The argument is that the states were afraid of mass attempts to collect the heavy
debt created by the Revolution. See Governmental Liability, supra note 4, at 130, for a
discussion of why, at the time of Independence, there was no comfortable place for
sovereign immunity in American political theory, even though the United States incorporated all English common law into its legal structure. In Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort
Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COLUmi. L. REv. 722 (1947), the authors
state: "Its [the immunity rule's] survival in this country after the Revolutionary War
is attributable, in all likelihood, to the financial instability of the infant American states
rather than to the stability of the doctrine's theoretical foundations."
26. The Perkins court made this argumnet, -Ind. at-, 251 N.E. 2d at 35: "Insurance has ameliorated the effects of such liability to private individuals and can do so
for the state."
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cost might be prohibitive. Special funds could be established to cover
liability, but unless the abolition of immunity is coupled with certain
limitations and exceptions, the economic threat would still remain. The
most straightforward method of dealing with this contention would be a
legislative solution.2"
Supplementing the financial fear is the concern that once sovereign
immunity is abolished, the courts will find themselves besieged with
fraudulent claims. Studies of suits filed against the state of New York and
the city of Boston conclude that there is nothing to justify either the
financial or the fraudulent claim fears. 8 However, in the absence of a
Tort Claims Act limiting the state's liability and establishing procedural
mechanisms, this result might not follow.2" Both of the policy arguments
for immunity thus far discussed demonstrate a need for a legislative
solution to the problem."°
The fundamental reason against sovereign immunity is that the law
27. A legislative solution can also provide various "low cost" features. Among
these are settlement procedures, low administrative costs, limitations upon lawyer's fees,
and exclusion of pain and suffering from recoverable damages.
28. For the study made of Boston, see Tort Liability, supra note 4, at 450. For the
New York study see Leflar & Kartrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1363 (1954).
29. In Campbell v. State, transcript filed, No. 1270 A253, Ind. App. Ct., Dec. 10,
1970, the Attorney-General, in Brief for Appellee at 23, used the following argument
against complete abrogation of immunity:
The California experience, alluded to by Klepinger, is often referred to by
parties adovcating the destruction of sovereign immunity. The abrogation attempted by Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District (1961), 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.
Reptr. 89, 359 Pac.2d 457 was complete as to nearly all existing governmental
immunities but the aftermath of that decision should be of interest to all advocates herein. What followed Muskopf in California was an onslought of tort
claims against the state, many frivolous and unfounded, but all seeking compensation and requiring the state's funds to combat them. Moratorium legislation
was the result.
30. An additional policy argument for state immunity was formulated by the
Indiana Supreme Court in Shoemaker v. Board of Comm'rs:
The theory upon which the state cannot be sued is, that the law-making power
will do full and ample justice to all the citizens of the state.
36 Ind. 175, 186 (1871). One-hundred years ago when governmental activities were extremely limited and liabilities from motor vehicles were non-existent, such an idyllic
statement was understandable. Hopefully, the state does have as its purpose "full and
ample justice to all the citizens," but the failure of the legislative, executive and judicial
branches to abrogate governmental immunity betrays such hope. Professor Bochard
succinctly states this argument as follows:
The supposition that the government will do no injustice, were it truly a postulate of our government, would long since have resulted in the waiver of all sovereign immunity and the voluntary submission to the adjudication of pecuniary
claims. The supposition that the government does not desire to perpetrate injustice is perhaps the strongest motive behind the present movement for the
abandonment of the English maxims on which immunity primarily rests.
Governmental Liability, supra note 4, at 805.
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of torts requires liability to follow negligence."' Private tort liability
encourages persons to act with reasonable care, and it could be argued
that disallowing governmental immunity would discourage tortious conduct by state employees."
The social policy of cost spreading is also universally invoked by
critics of the immunity principle.3 The Perkins court implicitly accepted
this policy by asking the rhetorical question why an individual should
bear the loss and injury resulting from a negligent act of the government. 4
Confronted with the criticism of sovereign immunity, the holdings
in Brinkman and Klepinger and the logic that all governmental units
should be treated alike, the Perkins court still chose to retain sovereign
immunity for governmental functions of the state., The court explains its
narrow result by raising the possibility of some logical reason for immunity. Possibly the only logical reason remaining is fear that total
elimination of immunity might create chaos."
The practical explanation of Perkins is that the court believed the
31. See Talley, Torts-Judicial Abrogation of the the Doctrine of Municipal
Immunity to Tort Liability, 41 N.C.L. Rev. 290, 291 (1963). Critics of the doctrine
argue that the denial of a remedy for a wrong violates due process of law, and they add
that the failure to give redress for wrongs is one more undesirable example of the
divergence of legal obligations from moral obligations. See, Schumate, Tort Claims
Against the State, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 242, 247 (1942).
32. A counter-argument is that high-ranking state officials will feel undue restraints
upon their normal activities unless legislative exemptions to liability are enacted for
their "discretionary" functions.
33. See generally Governmental Liability, supra note 4. Critics of the doctrine
cannot forget that in the leading English case holding a county immune from tort
liability, Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788), the court based
its decision upon the philosophy that ". . . [i]t is better that an individual should sustain
an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience." Id. at 362 (Ashhurst, J.).
(Ashhurst, J.).
Municipal immunity is historically traced to this case in which Lord Chief Justice
Kenyon refused to allow the "experiment" of bringing an action against the county
itself to succeed. Id. But as was pointed out by Fuller & Casner (see Tort Liability,
supra note 4), this case was not based upon sovereign immunity, but the doctrine was
later attached to Russell as a rationalization for its result.
34. -Ind. at -, 251 N.E.2d at 33.
35. "Chaos" may not be an exaggeration. Since the Perkins decision, approximately
85 cases have been filed against the state, and the rate is steadily increasing. The state
cannot settle these claims; the state cannot hire local counsel to assist in the defense; the
state has no procedural mechanism equipped to handle a heavy case load; and perhaps
most significant, in the face of millions of dollars worth of suits pending and several
large judgments, the state has no money appropriated with which to pay these judgments so that successful plaintiffs may not be able to get execution of their judgments
in view of the restriction in art. IV, § 24 of the constitution that "no special act making
compensation to any person claiming damages against the state shall ever be passed."
Interview with Thomas C. Mills, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, in Indianapolis,
April 16, 1971.
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legislature was better equipped than the judiciary to establish guidelines
for the prosecution of claims against the state. 6 Had the court abandoned
the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, it would
have had either to define the scope and nature of the state's new liability
or merely present the state with an unqualified tort liability. 7
Perkins managed simultaneously to continue and reverse the
trend of striking down governmental immunity. On the one hand, the
court ruled that the state need no longer consent to be sued for torts
arising out of its proprietary functions. On the other hand, the court
refused to agree that no sound reason for retaining governmental immunity exists and revived the distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions. The Perkins court may have raised the possibility
of the existence of a reason for immunity to conceal its feelings that the
state's new tort liability must be developed by the legislature. If the court
believes that governmental immunity should be abolished, it could force
the desired legislative action by eliminating the proprietary-governmental
distinction.
EDWARD F.

MCCREA

36. For example, the legislature could provide answers to the following questions:
(1) will prompt notice to the state be required as is required to cities; (2) should a
special court of claims be established; (3) who will have authority for bringing about
settlements of claims against the state; (4) are limitations upon attorney's fees advisable; (5) what will the upper limits of recovery be, if any; (6) would liability insurance

have certain required provisions; (7) will the right to jury trial be denied; and (8)
will a judgment against the government bar an action against the employee? Possible
solutions to these questions emerge from the tort claims acts of the federal government
and four states which have abrogated sovereign immunity. See note 7 supra.
37. The Indiana Appellate Court, in Campbell v. State of Indiana, - Ind. App.
' 269 N.E. 2d 765, May 27, 1971, held that the maintenance and repair of public
highways by the state is a governmental function, and with reference to the Perkins
opinion, stated:
We do not here choose to speculate upon what reasons if any may exist for
the continued application or misapplication of the traditional governmentalproprietary distinction. Nor do we deem it within our appellate prerogative to
judicially abolish sovereign immunity in its entirety. We feel compelled to
recognize and honor the aforementioned governmental-proprietary distinction
without editorial comment upon its logic or efficacy.
Id. at 767.
The Court, recognizing the desirability of additional guidelines, adopted the definition
of "governmental functions" developed by the Utah courts in Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah
2d 375, 366 P. 2d 986, 988 (1961) :
The most general test of governmental function relates to the nature of the
activity. It must be something done or furnished for the general public good,
that is, of a "public or governmental character," such as the maintenance
and operation of public schools, hospitals, public charities, public parks or
recreational facilities. In addition to the above mentioned general test these
supplemental ones are also applied: (a) whether there is special pecuniary
benefit or profit to the city and (b) whether the activity is of such a nature
as to be in real competition with free enterprise.

